Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679- 1749) fu poetessa, drammaturga e filosofa. La vivacità intellettuale e la forte determinazione le permisero di aggirare il pregiudizio di genere e di sottrarsi alle dinamiche di marginalizzazione femminile tipiche dell’età moderna. Pur celandosi dietro l’anonimato, Cockburn prese parte attiva al dibattito filosofico del tempo, intervenendo soprattutto in materia di morale. Le sue opere filosofiche, scritte in difesa di Locke o di Clarke, custodiscono, nonostante il dichiarato intento apologetico, tratti di originalità e indipendenza, particolarmente evidenti nella (...) teoria dell’obbligo morale, nell’interpretazione modale della dottrina lockeana d’identità personale, nell’ipotesi di una natura ontologica dello spazio. (shrink)

A recent study by Castellani et al. (JAMA 302(23):2573–2579, 2009) describes the population-level effects of the choices of individuals who underwent molecular carrier screening for cystic fibrosis (CF) in Veneto, in the northeastern part of Italy, between 1993 and 2007. We discuss some of the ethical issues raised by the policies and individual choices that are the subject of this study. In particular, (1) we discuss the ethical issues raised by the acquisition of genetic information through antenatal carrier testing; (2) (...) we consider whether by choosing to procreate naturally these couples can harm the resulting child and/or other members of society, and what the moral implications of such harm would be; (3) we consider whether by choosing to avoid natural procreation carrier couples can harm current or future individuals affected by cystic fibrosis; (4) we discuss whether programs that make carrier testing available can be considered eugenic programs. (shrink)

This paper analyses the phenomenology and epistemology of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Bard. The computational architecture underpinning these chatbots are large language models (LLMs), which are generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems trained on a massive dataset of text extracted from the Web. We conceptualise these LLMs as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts, used for various cognitive tasks such as translating, summarizing, answering questions, information-seeking, and much more. Phenomenologically, LLMs can be experienced as a “quasi-other”; when that happens, users anthropomorphise them. (...) For most users, current LLMs are black boxes, i.e., for the most part, they lack data transparency and algorithmic transparency. They can, however, be phenomenologically and informationally transparent, in which case there is an interactional flow. Anthropomorphising and interactional flow can, in some users, create an attitude of (unwarranted) trust towards the output LLMs generate. We conclude this paper by drawing on the epistemology of trust and testimony to examine the epistemic implications of these dimensions. Whilst LLMs generally generate accurate responses, we observe two epistemic pitfalls. Ideally, users should be able to match the level of trust that they place in LLMs to the degree that LLMs are trustworthy. However, both their data and algorithmic opacity and their phenomenological and informational transparency can make it difficult for users to calibrate their trust correctly. The effects of these limitations are twofold: users may adopt unwarranted attitudes of trust towards the outputs of LLMs (which is particularly problematic when LLMs hallucinate), and the trustworthiness of LLMs may be undermined. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that one of the arguments usually put forward in defence of universism is in tension with current set theoretic practice. According to universism, there is only one set theoretic universe, V, and when applying the method of forcing we are not producing new universes, but only simulating them inside V. Since the usual interpretation of set generic forcing is used to produce a “simulation” of an extension of V from a countable set inside V itself, (...) the above argument is credited to be a strong defence of universism. However, I claim, such an argument does not take into account current mathematical practice. Indeed, it is possible to find theorems that are available to the multiversists but that the advocate of universism cannot prove. For example, it is possible to prove results on infinite games in non-well-founded set-theories plus the axiom of determinacy (such as ZF + AFA + PD) that are not available in ZFC + PD. These results, I contend, are philosophically problematic on a strict universist approach to forcing. I suggest that the best way to avoid the difficulty is to adopt a pluralist conception of set theory and embrace a set theoretic multiverse. Consequently, the current practice of set generic forcing better supports a multiverse conception of set theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a naturalist approach in philosophy of mathematics justifies a pluralist conception of set theory. For the pluralist, there is not a Single Universe, but there is rather a Multiverse, composed by a plurality of universes generated by various set theories. In order to justify a pluralistic approach to sets, I apply the two naturalistic principles developed by Penelope Maddy (cfr. Maddy (1997)), UNIFY and MAXIMIZE, and analyze through them the potential of the set theoretic (...) multiverse to be the best framework for mathematical practice. According to UNIFY, an adequate set theory should be foundational, in the sense that it should allow one to represent all the currently accepted mathematical theories. As for MAXIMIZE, this states that any adequate set theory should be as powerful as possible, allowing one to prove as many results and isomorphisms as possible. In a recent paper, Maddy (2017) has argued that this two principle justify ZFC as the best framework for mathematical practice. I argue that, pace Maddy, these two principles justify a multiverse conception of set theory, more precisely, the generic multiverse with a core (GMH). (shrink)

Teller argued that violations of Bell’s inequalities are to be explained by interpreting quantum entangled systems according to ‘relational holism’, that is, by postulating that they exhibit irreducible (‘inherent’) relations. Teller also suggested a possible application of this idea to quantum statistics. However, the basic proposal was not explained in detail nor has the additional idea about statistics been articulated in further work. In this article, I reconsider relational holism, amending it and spelling it out as appears necessary for a (...) proper assessment, and application, of the position. †To contact the author, please write to: FB Philosophie‐Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Universitätstraße 10, 78464, Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: matteo.morganti@uni ‐konstanz.de. (shrink)

The Spiritual Forms in Nicolai Hartmann’s critical ontology. For a critical-genetic interpretation of The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author critically discusses the theoretical assumptions underlying Nicolai Hartmann’s 1933 The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author deals with the main categorial problems involved in the Hartmannian discussion about the spiritual being, also looking at his previous production. In particular, the Author analyzes the position of the ontic level of spiritual being with respect to the previous three real ontic levels (inorganic, (...) organic, psychological) and the mutual relationship between the three fundamental forms of spiritual being identified by Hartmann (personal, objective, objectified). The Author believes that the 1933 volume has been poorly considered in its direct links with the overall project of critical ontology. (shrink)

This paper investigates some core aspects of Guy de La Brosse’s botanical work. In the first section, the focus is on the epistemological principles of La Brosse’s botany by analyzing the first and second book of the treatise De la nature, vertu et utilité des plantes. In the second section, the author discusses the role of Paracelsus’s chemistry in La Brosse’s work, with a particular attention to the third book of the De la nature. The final section deals with La (...) Brosse’s interest in the visualization of plants. Here, the author provides the transcription and first Italian translation of a short manuscript related to Abraham Bosse’s engravings for La Brosse’s unfinished book Icones posthumae. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to analyze the concept of ecstasy in F. W. J. Schelling's Erlangen Lectures. In particular, I intend to show how it constitutes a significant evolution with regard to the model of reminiscence and in particular that of Mitwissenschaft, as presented in the Weltalter. The essay focuses on three aspects of the notion of ecstasy: 1) its relation to temporality, 2) its relation to interiority, and 3) its noetic value and its moral dimension. In conclusion, (...) I will show how in Erlangen a movement of progressive de-historicization and de-theosophicization of ecstasy began, culminating in the Berliner Einleitung of 1842/43. (shrink)

A groundbreaking text for the account of the problem of evil in German idealism. Here is a brief review for the German audience.

In this contribution we will present a generalization of de Finetti's betting game in which a gambler is allowed to buy and sell unknown events' betting odds from more than one bookmaker. In such a framework, the sole coherence of the books the gambler can play with is not sucient, as in the original de Finetti's frame, to bar the gambler from a sure-win opportunity. The notion of joint coherence which we will introduce in this paper characterizes those coherent books (...) on which sure- win is impossible. Our main results provide geometric characterizations of the space of all books which are jointly coherent with a xed one. As a consequence we will also show that joint coherence is decidable. (shrink)

A long historiographical tradition has claimed that the famous Pietro Pomponazzi’s Tractatus de immortalitate animae had been inspired by Tommaso de Vio’s Commentary on De anima – whose basic thesis was that, according to the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, the human soul was mortal – even though Pomponazzi in his entire work never mentioned Caietanus as a model. Firstly, this article frames the status quaestionis focusing on affinities and divergences between the two books and on the possible relationship and (...) exchange between the two authors, especially on the topic of the Aristotelian psychology. Secondly, the present study shows what emerges from a cross-reading of the sources which includes the collection of the Opuscula published in 1519 by the Dominican friar Bartolomeo Spina, who explicitly accused Caietanus of having paved the way for the scandalous and anti-Christian Pomponazzi’s position. The important gain of this collation of texts is the discovery of an unseen moment of debate with Caietanus inside Pomponazzi’s Tractatus. (shrink)

Tommaso Giannini (1556-1638) was a prominent professor at the Ferrara Studium between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century. Probably influenced by Platonic sympathies nurtured by the Court and partly by the University milieu, in 1587 he published his first work titled De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platonicorum liber unus, which was a catalyst for his academic career. His De providentia displays a large amount of sources always tacitly used: Marsilio Ficino, Jacques Charpentier, Giulio Serina, Stefano Tiepolo, Teofilo Zimara, (...) Bessarion, Agostino Steuco, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and amid the ancients Plotinus, Plutarch, Sirianus, Proclus (read through Teofilo Zimara and Leonico Tomeo), Iamblichus, Apuleius, Calcidius, Ammonius, Psellus. Though a compilative work, the De providentia retains nonetheless a great importance insofar as it contributes to focus the bibliotheca platonica of the time, furthermore in the same years and place of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’s teaching. (shrink)

Tommaso Giannini was a prominent professor at the ferrarese Studium between sixteenth and seventeenth century. Probably influenced by Platonic sympathies nurtured by the Court and partly by the University milieu, in 1587 he published his first work titled De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platonicorum liber unus, which was a catalyst for his academic career. A compilative work in essence, the De providentia displays a large amount of sources always tacitly used: Marsilio Ficino, Jacques Charpentier, Giulio Serina, Stefano Tiepolo, (...) Teofilo Zimara, Bessarion, Agostino Steuco and amid the ancients Plotinus, Plutarcus, Sirianus, Proclus, Giamblicus, Apuleius, Calcidius, Ammonius, Psellus. A small place is reserved to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and precisely to his Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem. The aim of the paper is to provide a supplement of analysis of Giannini’s interest in Pico’s works considering his later writings, each one commonly identified as Disputationes Aristotelicae. (shrink)

An analysis of personal self-determination with a special reference to Aquinas.

The aim of this study is to illustrate the role played by Augustine’s Commentary on the Genesis in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. This work is of great importance for Aquinas, not only because it is the work where Augustine clarifies his interpretation of creation, but also because creation is, among the theological topics, perhaps the most philosophical, insofar as it gives the opportunity of elaborating on many philosophical issues. In particular, the goal of the study is to rethink the (...) positions of Aquinas and Augustine on one of these issues, that is the relationship between soul and body. I mean to call into question two historiographical theses: first, that Augustine and Aquinas formulate positions that are irreconcilable with each other, and second, that they in no way address that which we today call the Mind-Body Problem. (shrink)

Providence, from a philosophical point of view, is a problematic node that runs through much of the history of Western thought. The theme is closely linked to that of necessity, contingency, and causality, and so it can receive a contribution by analysing it starting from Aquinas’ natural philosophy. From the De Principiis Naturae, Aquinas’ youthful text, we witness the development of the theme in this context, which allows us to grasp providence in relation with necessity. The final causality acquires centrality. (...) It is as an “engine” that pushes everything to be according to the proper modality of its nature, and therefore also in the mode of necessity. The rootedness in the natural philosophy allows us to grasp the providence as that modality of divine government capable of holding together the necessity of God’s action and creatural contingency, leaving the rational creature free in its own choices. (shrink)

The dissemination of Tommaso Campanella’s thought in the seventeenth-century Dutch context was not only due to his concern with the war involving the Netherlands. His works, indeed, were referred to by scholars interested in establishing a new philosophy and natural history. Johannes De Raey and Paul Veezaerdt took up some of his perspectives on the history of Aristotelian philosophy, and dealt with the theological implications of his arguments.

(Tesis de Licencia en Filosofía. Moderador Alessandro Salucci, OP. Angelicum, Roma, Febrero 2006) -/- El problema causal está íntimamente ligado y nos lleva necesariamente al problema del ser, finito e infinito. Por tanto, no es un problema más en la filosofía. En la larga discusión que se planteó en el último período escolástico (fines del s. XIX y primera mitad del s. XX) las líneas de solución más originales las ha dado el p. Cornelio Fabro -/- Por lo tanto, nos (...) proponemos investigar su propuesta de solución. El p. Fabro defendía la necesidad de la dependencia causal a través de la noción de participación. Nuestro objetivo es por tanto hacer un análisis crítico de la postura del p. Fabro acerca de la dependencia causal como exigencia del ser participado, a través del estudio de algunas de sus obras más importantes al respecto. Buscamos respondernos por qué para el p. Fabro el ser participado exige una causa, y valorar sus argumentos. -/- Como hemos dicho, para nuestro trabajo nos valdremos ante todo del estudio de algunas de las obras más importantes del p. Cornelio Fabro con respecto a la causalidad. Nos referimos en concreto a tres de ellas: la primera, el artículo La difesa critica del principio di causa, donde el autor expone de un modo preciso la noción de participación como el fundamento de la justificación crítica del principio de causalidad. Las otras dos obras son La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo San Tommaso d’Aquino, donde la noción de participación es puesta al centro de la metafísica tomista, como clave de bóveda de las tesis más características de la doctrina del Angélico; y Partecipazione e Causalità, obra en la cual el autor rescata el esse tomista original como fundamento de una metafísica de la causalidad. -/- Este estudio nos ha llevado a destacar la importancia de la noción de “ser que no es por sí” como noción esencialmente relacionada a la noción de participación y por otro lado cuasi necesaria para hacer el pasaje a la causa. (shrink)

The new theoretical perspective proposed by the Open Theism theologians, compels us to study in depth and to evaluate the “classic” argumentative tools used to solve the ancient antinomy between divine omniscience and human freedom, to which the thesis of the Open Theism try to give an innovative solution. Among these tools – invoked by many authors in the contemporary debate about omniscience, in analytic philosophy of religion – several ones are part of Thomas Aquinas’ thought: the division in primary (...) and secondary causes, the division of God’s knowledge, the distinction between propositions understood in sensu composito or in sensu diviso, the division between necessity de dicto or de re, and others. This paper aims to analyze the interpretation of these tools developed in the contemporary context and tries to draw some conclusions on the overall efficacy of the “Thomistic Solution” that we can build starting from these tools. La nuova prospettiva teoretica proposta dai sostenitori dell’Open Theism ha reso necessario un approfondimento e una valutazione degli strumenti argomentativi “classici” utilizzati per risolvere l’antica antinomia tra onniscienza divina e libertà umana, alla quale le tesi dell’Open Theism cercano di dare una soluzione innovativa. Tra questi strumenti – recuperati da molti autori nel contemporaneo dibattito sull’onniscienza, all’interno della filosofia analitica della religione – ve ne sono molti attribuiti a Tommaso d’Aquino: la divisione in causa prima e cause seconde, la suddivisione della conoscenza di Dio, la distinzione tra proposizioni intese in senso composto o in senso diviso, quella tra necessità de dicto e necessità de re, e altri. Il presente contributo si propone di analizzarne l’interpretazione sviluppata nel contesto contemporaneo e trarre alcune conclusioni sull’efficacia complessiva della “soluzione tomistica” che si può delineare a partire da questi strumenti. (shrink)

L’Exercitium academicum circa praescientiam daemonum (1666), pubblicato nella riformata Jena, tematizza una questione dibattuta nella Scolastica fra XIII e XIV secolo ma le cui radici risalgono ad Agostino d'Ippona, cui si deve il primo testo sull'argomento: la prescienza dei demoni. L'analisi segue la traccia del De divinatione daemonum agostiniano, mentre appare critica nei confronti delle posizioni di Tommaso d'Aquino e dei tomisti. Ad esse, in particolare riguardo alla natura delle facoltà intellettive demoniche, egli contrappone Giovanni Duns Scoto, Durando di (...) san Porziano e non meglio specificati nominales, accomunati in un indistinto riferimento alla teoria delle species. Ciò non toglie che il testo segua poi Tommaso nell'articolazione delle forme di prescienza dei demoni e nella definizione di questa come conoscenza congetturale. Scopo del nostro intervento sarà infatti mostrare, attraverso l'analisi che per la prima volta sarà condotta sul testo, lo spaccato di una comunità conversazionale nella quale le linee di forza e le distinzioni che animano il dibattito si mostrano autonome rispetto alle posizioni storiche di cattolici e riformati. Nell’Exercitium, Duns Scoto è contrapposto ai tomisti e, con Agostino e Durando di san Porziano – che costituisce una fonte comune del dibattito secentesco insieme a Bonaventura, Aureolo, Suarez, Vazquez, Gregorio di Valencia, e in tale veste sarà ripreso di lì a poco da Leibniz -, è cooptato tra gli autori a sostegno della sua tesi. Lungi dall'essere un esercizio di eclettismo o la stanca ripetizione di formule scolastiche, lo scritto getta luce su un dibattito universitario nel quale le fonti sono usate non come auctoritates ma quale repertorio di teorie da smontare e rimontare; ad esse l’Exercitium attinge per soluzioni che si definiscono in relazione a finalità filosofiche o dottrinali, ma non politiche né confessionali. (shrink)

L'elaborato intende analizzare lo statuto ontologico dell'ente a partire dal binomio esse e id quod est, sviluppato da Tommaso nel commento al De Hebdomadibus di Boezio, specificando i concetti di partecipazione come causalità forte, e di essere come massimo estensivo e più generale.

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

First aim of this paper is to show that Evidentialism, when paired with a Psychologistic ontology of evidence, is unable to account for ordinary cases of inferential justification. As many epistemologists have maintained, however, when it is paired with a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, Evidentialism is unable to explain in a satisfactory way ordinary cases of perceptual justification. So, the Evidentialist is faced with a dilemma. Second aim of this paper is to give an argument in favour of Propositionalism about (...) evidence, and so to motivate the conclusion that perceptual justification must be accounted for in non-evidentialist terms. By this I do not mean to defend a strongly Non-Evidentialist epistemology, according to which there are doxastic attitudes which are unsupported by any justifier. More modestly, I aim to motivate the weakly Non-Evidentialist epistemology according to which a subject’s perceptual beliefs may be justified by non-evidential justifiers. I conclude the paper by explaining why I believe that Pryor's dogmatism supplies a model for the way in which an internalist who is persuaded by my argument might want to detail her weakly Non-Evidentialist account of perceptual justification. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on transmission and failure of transmission of warrant. We identify three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for transmission of warrant, and we show that their satisfaction grounds a number of interesting epistemic phenomena that have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. We then scrutinise Wright’s analysis of transmission failure and improve on extant readings of it. Nonetheless, we present a Bayesian counterexample that shows that Wright’s analysis is partially incoherent with our analysis of (...) warrant transmission and prima facie defective. We conclude exploring three alternative lines of reply: developing a more satisfactory account of transmission failure, which we outline; dismissing the Bayesian counterexample by rejecting some of its assumptions; reinterpreting Wright’s analysis to make it immune to the counterexample. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

The paper investigates the ethics of information transparency (henceforth transparency). It argues that transparency is not an ethical principle in itself but a pro-ethical condition for enabling or impairing other ethical practices or principles. A new definition of transparency is offered in order to take into account the dynamics of information production and the differences between data and information. It is then argued that the proposed definition provides a better understanding of what sort of information should be disclosed and what (...) sort of information should be used in order to implement and make effective the ethical practices and principles to which an organisation is committed. The concepts of “heterogeneous organisation” and “autonomous computational artefact” are further defined in order to clarify the ethical implications of the technology used in implementing information transparency. It is argued that explicit ethical designs, which describe how ethical principles are embedded into the practice of software design, would represent valuable information that could be disclosed by organisations in order to support their ethical standing. (shrink)

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, (...) we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory. (shrink)

Wokeism—as an ideology—is a potent enabler of group polarization. Secondly, polarization among its upholders results from the fact that they often display those behavioral patterns typical of behavioral conformity. Thirdly, groupthink and behavioral conformity jointly lead the upholders of wokeism to disbelieve any view that question theirs.

In recent work, the interrelated questions of whether there is a fundamental level to reality, whether ontological dependence must have an ultimate ground, and whether the monist thesis should be endorsed that the whole universe is ontologically prior to its parts have been explored with renewed interest. Jonathan Schaffer has provided arguments in favour of 'priority monism' in a series of articles (2003, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, forthcoming). In this paper, these arguments are analysed, and it is claimed that they are (...) not compelling: in particular, the possibility that there is no ultimate level of basic entities that compose everything else is on a par with the possibility of infinite 'upward' complexity. The idea that we must, at any rate, postulate an ontologically fundamental level for methodological reasons ( Cameron 2008 ) is also discussed and found unconvincing: all things considered, there may be good reasons for endorsing 'metaphysical infinitism'. In any event, a higher degree of caution in formulating metaphysical claims than found in the extant literature appears advisable. (shrink)

Th is paper looks at quantum theory and the Standard Model of elementary particles with a view to suggesting a detailed empirical implementation of trope ontology in harmony with our best physics.

This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the distinctive features of quantum statistics are exclusively determined by the nature of the properties it describes. In particular, all statistically relevant properties of identical quantum particles in many-particle systems are conjectured to be irreducible, ‘inherent’ properties only belonging to the whole system. This allows one to explain quantum statistics without endorsing the ‘Received View’ that particles are non-individuals, or postulating that quantum systems obey peculiar probability distributions, or assuming that there are primitive (...) restrictions on the range of states accessible to such systems. With this, the need for an unambiguously metaphysical explanation of certain physical facts is acknowledged and satisfied. (shrink)

In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)

Abstract In this article, a critical assessment is carried out of the two available forms of nominalism with respect to the ontological constitution of material objects: resemblance nominalism and trope theory. It is argued that these two nominalistic ontologies naturally converge towards each other when the problems they have to face are identified and plausible solutions to these problems are sought. This suggests a synthesis between the two perspectives along lines first proposed by Sellars, whereby, at least at the level (...) of the simplest, truly fundamental constituents of reality, every particular is literally both an object and a particularized property (or, alternatively put, the distinction between objects and properties dissolves). Some potential problems and open issues for such an approach to nominalism in ontology are identified and discussed, with particular emphasis on the sort of fundamentalism that seems to crucially underlie the proposed ontology. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0145-x Authors Matteo Morganti, Department of Philosophy, University of Rome ‘RomaTRE’, Via Ostiense, 234, 00144 Rome, Italy Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150. (shrink)

Steinberg has recently proposed an argument against Schaffer’s priority monism. The argument assumes the principle of Necessity of Monism, which states that if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. In this paper, I argue that Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up Necessity of Monism for an alternative principle, that I call Essentiality of Fundamentality, and that such a principle is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as well.

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the socalled pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, ‘ontic’ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of (...) ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting. (shrink)

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also (...) unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. (shrink)

If there is an area of discourse in which disagreement is virtually absent, it is mathematics. After all, mathematicians justify their claims with deductive proofs: arguments that entail their conclusions. But is mathematics really exceptional in this respect? Looking at the history and practice of mathematics, we soon realize that it is not. First, deductive arguments must start somewhere. How should we choose the starting points (i.e., the axioms)? Second, mathematicians, like the rest of us, are fallible. Their ability to (...) recognize whether a putative proof is correct is not infallible. In most cases, disagreement over the correctness of a putative proof is, however, evanescent. Once an error is spotted and communicated, the disagreement disappears. But this is not always the case. Sometimes it is recalcitrant; that is, it persists over time. In order to zoom in on this type of disagreement and explain its very possibility, we focus on a single case study: a decades-long (1921-1949) controversy between Federigo Enriques and Francesco Severi, two prominent exponents of the Italian school of algebraic geometry. We suggest that the instability of the mathematical community to which they belonged can be explained by the gap between an abstract criterion of rigor and local criteria of acceptability. It is this instability that made the existence of recalcitrant disagreement over putative proofs possible. We do not condemn speculative mathematics but rather its pretense of being rigorous mathematics. In this respect, we show that the overly self-confident Severi and the more intuitive, visionary Enriques had a completely different attitude. (shrink)

This paper provides a defence of the account of partial resemblances between properties according to which such resemblances are due to partial identities of constituent properties. It is argued, first of all, that the account is not only required by realists about universals à la Armstrong, but also useful (of course, in an appropriately re-formulated form) for those who prefer a nominalistic ontology for material objects. For this reason, the paper only briefly considers the problem of how to conceive of (...) the structural universals first posited by Armstrong in order to explain partial resemblances, and focuses instead on criticisms that have been levelled against the theory (by Pautz, Eddon, Denkel and Gibb) and that apply regardless of one’s preferred ontological framework. The partial identity account is defended from these objections and, in doing so, a hitherto quite neglected connection—between the debate about partial similarity as partial identity and that concerning ontological finitism versus infinitism—is looked at in some detail. (shrink)

Philosophers of science, particularly those working on science and values, often talk about the need for science to be socially responsible. However, what this means is not clear. In this paper, we review the contributions of philosophers of science to the debate over socially responsible science and explore the dimensions that a fruitful account of socially responsible science should address. Our review shows that offering a comprehensive account is difficult. We contend that broad calls for socially responsible science that fail (...) to attend to relevant dimensions are not the solution, as they preclude meaningful changes to research institutions and practices. We conclude that narrower, more explicit accounts are more likely to lead to substantive transformation. (shrink)

A cosmological principle, because it was the first to be created, Exu presents itself as the creative protomatter, whose expansive and unfinished character makes possible the appearanceof all other creations. He is the animating principle of existence and in everything there isExu. The crossroads is its space-time and this fact would explain why “black culture is acrossroads culture”. But, incarnated in Afro-diasporic practices in the Atlantic bands, Exunot only vigorously maintains his multifaceted power, showing that colonial redemption didnot obtain the (...) expected result, but also shows that its everyday meanings in the African BlackDiaspora here in the Americas they are the result of battles, negotiations, authoritarianism,power regimes, violence, transgressions, silencing and alliances experienced in the colonialdynamic, as Luiz Rufno reminds us in his book Pedagogia das Encruzilhadas (2019). (shrink)

Husserl’s Logical Grammar is intended to explain how complex expressions can be constructed out of simple ones so that their meaning turns out to be determined by the meanings of their constituent parts and the way they are put together. Meanings are thus understood as structured contents and classified into formal categories to the effect that the logical properties of expressions reflect their grammatical properties. As long as linguistic meaning reduces to the intentional content of pre-linguistic representations, however, it is (...) not trivial to account for how semantics relates to syntax in this context. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s Logical Grammar as a system of recursive rules operating on representations and suggest that the syntactic form of representations contributes to their semantics because it carries information about semantic role. I further discuss Husserl’s syntactic account of the unity of propositions and argue that, on this account, logical form supervenes on syntactic form. In the last section I draw some implications for the phenomenology of thought and conjecture that the structural features it displays are likely to convey the syntactic structures of an underlying language-like representational system. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to examine recent contributions to Schelling research that appeared in three miscellanies in 2020. Their common thread is Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which, because of its dynamic and processual characteristics, is considered relevant in the debate on realism, philosophy of biology and environmental ethics. In the historical-philosophical field, many contributions highlight Schelling’s debt to Kant and Spinoza and his close relationship with the Romantic movement. Lastly, the essay analyses contributions concerning the Spätphilosophie, showing how (...) Schelling’s philosophy is to be considered first and foremost as historical philosophy. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)